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Abstract 
 
Along the years, several authors have been trying to understand the IPO underpricing 
puzzle. This study tests the relation between uncertainty and underpricing. 
This study try to understand whether the uncertainty is a possible justification for 
underpricing, using volatility of the shares’ price in the first trading day after the IPO as 
a proxy for uncertainty. 
Information about the intraday trading prices from the first day of trading after the IPO 
was collected for a sample of 614 IPOs, registered in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) occurred between 1st of January of 2000 and 31st of December of 2013 with gross 
proceed higher than 100 million dollars. 
The results confirm that the average initial return is positive (11.4%) and supports the 
prediction of a positive relation between uncertainty and underpricing. 
 
Key-words: Initial public offering; Underpricing; Ex ante uncertainty; Daily 
volatility 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the past few decades Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) has been study in every shape 
and size, addressing several problems and studying several possible justifications for it, 
not only in a daily basis in a professional environment but specially in the academic 
research environment. Among all these problems, consistently positive initial returns in 
the first day of trading, when compared to the offer price, i.e., underpricing, is the most 
studied problem regarding IPOs, however this puzzle is still a big mystery. One of the 
possible justifications to underpricing is the ex-ante uncertainty (Ritter, 1984)(Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986), i.e., the uncertainty around the future price of the shares about to be issued, 
or in other words, how hard it is to value the company. 
As ex-ante uncertainty cannot be measured directly, it is necessary to find a proxy for 
it in order to test their relation. This study uses as proxy the standard deviation of the first 
day of trading after the IPO of the issued share. Similar choices were done in previous 
studies, but using the standard deviation of the first twenty days of trading (Ritter, 1984), 
first four days after the first day of trading (Miller & Reilly, 1987), fifty ninth days after 
the first day of trading (Clarkson, 1994) and first 100 days of trading (Yu & Tse, 2006). 
Other proxies were also uses, and some proved to be relevant, such as, the sales from the 
twelve months prior to the issue (Ritter, 1984), the inverse of the gross proceeds obtained 
in the issue ((Beatty & Ritter, 1986)(Miller & Reilly, 1987)), the age of the company and 
the number of risks presented in the prospectus (Clarkson, 1994). 
Even though many authors have focus on this theme, this dissertation differentiate 
from previous studies by using a more recent sample of companies, and by using as a 
proxy for uncertainty the realized daily volatility1  , giving more importance to the day 
that the share starts to be traded. 
A linear regression model using a sample of 614 companies’ IPOs from the NYSE 
occurred between 2000 and 2013 was estimated. 
                                                          
1 The realized volatility is further explained based on Areal and Taylor (2002). 
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The rest of this report proceeds as follows. In section 2 the literature review of the 
topic is presented. Section 3 presents the sample while in section 4 the methodology is 
explained. The results are presented in section 5, and finally, section 6 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This sections starts with a brief description of some empirical literature regarding the 
IPO underpricing, in order to provide background to the following studies. Then, a 
revision of the main literature regarding the relation between underpricing and 
uncertainty is made, giving special attention to studies that had as a proxy the standard 
deviation of the aftermarket prices, but analysing all the proxies adopted by the authors. 
 
2.1 The IPO underpricing 
As previously mentioned, underpricing in IPOs is a problem with quite a long story. 
The perseverance of this problem, and consequently it vast literature, is mainly due to 
IPOs constant pricing problems. 
 A couple decades ago, Ibbotson (1975) studied the price performance of North-
American IPOs from 1960 to 1969 randomly choosing one IPO from each month from 
all registered IPOs in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The author, using 
risk-adjusted returns concluded that, on average, the price at the end of the first trading 
day is 11.4% higher than the offer price.  A few years later, Ibbotson upgrade his work 
using a sample of over 5,000 IPOs, occurred between 1960 and 1982, and found an 
average underpricing of 18.8%. Ritter (1984) using a sample of North-American IPOs 
occurred between 1977 and 1982, found on average an initial return equal to 26.5%. The 
sample included a hot issue period from January of 1980 to March of 1981, but even 
without accounting for this period, the author found an average underpricing of 16.3%. 
Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) gathered data from several studies to confirm the 
presence of this phenomenon for 32 international IPO markets as Chinese, Australian, 
Portuguese, British, German, Japanese, among others. 
When analysing the IPO process, there is a time lapse between the release of the offer 
price of the respective share and the beginning of trading on the market. This interval 
could be one of the justifications for underpricing, but, as stated by Ljungqvist (2004), in 
the US market “the offer price is set just days (or even more typically hours) before 
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trading on the stock market begins. This means that market movements between pricing 
and trading are negligible and so usually ignored” (Ljungqvist, 2004, pp. 6).   
 
2.2 IPO underpricing: asymmetric information 
In our study, we focused our attention in one of the most studied justification for IPO 
underpricing: asymmetric information. This justification explores the bias of information 
among the agents in the process of the IPO. Based on this justification we addressed four 
other that use asymmetric information as a groundwork. 
 
2.2.1  The winner’s curse 
Ljungqvist (2004) found several explanations for underpricing, from behavioural, to 
asymmetric information models, passing through institutional or ownership and control, 
all can be play a role in justifying the underpricing. Our study will focus on asymmetric 
information models, more specific the winner’s curse justification. The premise of this 
justification is the higher the uncertainty, the higher the underpricing, which will be 
further explained. 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) mentioned that is not unusual for underwriters to know 
beforehand that the possible demand is five times higher than the shares available. Rock 
(1986) using this information stated that uninformed investors (investors that do not spend 
any time and money to find out the value of a share, and that play a crucial role in IPOs, 
once they are the one who guarantee the success of the majority of them) “receives none 
of the underpriced issues due to the rationing brought on by the informed demand, and 
all of the overpriced issues” (Rock, 1986, pp. 188), what will lead the uninformed 
investors to revised downwards their valuation of new IPO shares, in order have a 
nonnegative expected return. Rock would published his work concluding that “the 
discount is a natural consequence of the present model, which incorporate asymmetric 
information and rationing” (Rock, 1986, pp. 188). This model was the groundwork for 
several others regarding this subject. 
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In the previous model, there was although a small hurdle as the rationing problem 
could not be tested in the North-American IPO market as in most of the markets, since 
the way the rationing is applied is not publicly disclosed. However, the same could not 
be said about the Singaporean IPO market. Koh and Walter (1989) did a direct test of 
Rock’s (1986) model and state that “rationing occurs more often for ‘good’ shares than 
for ‘bad’ shares“(Koh and Walter, 1989, pp. 251). This study was unique since in the 
Singaporean market, whenever the demand surpasses the number of shares to be offered, 
it is public and “all applications of a particular size have an equal probability of being 
accepted” (Koh and Walter, 1989, pp. 252). The authors concluded that rationing of new 
issues explains the unseasoned new issues anomaly, that winner’s curse is strongly 
evident and that there is a positive correlation between underpricing and oversubscription. 
In the meanwhile, Ritter (1984) studied the 1980 “hot issues”, trying to find a 
justification for it, by developing an implication of Rock’s (1986) model. He starts by 
arguing that some IPOs are more underpriced than others, more precisely, IPOs with 
higher risk are generally more underpriced than low-risk IPOs. In order to test it, Ritter 
checked that “if high-risk offerings are an unusually large fraction of initial public 
offerings in some periods, these periods should also have unusually high average initial 
returns” (Ritter, 1984, pp. 216). Once risk is not something measurable, the author needed 
to use a proxy to risk, which he used the sales from the most recent 12 months, and the 
daily standard deviation of the first 20 daily initial returns of the aftermarket. Ritter 
concluded that there is a positive relation between risk and initial returns (and its 
heteroscedasticity), i.e., that the greater the uncertainty about the price of the new shares, 
the greater the advantage of the informed investors, hence, the deeper the underpricing. 
When the demand for the shares of one IPOs is bigger than the shares available, which 
happens with the majority of IPOs, the issuing firm can no longer increase the number of 
shares, then it has to be implemented a quantity rationing. Beatty and Ritter (1986), when 
studying the IPO underpricing, argue that this rationing does not happen in a random way 
across issues. They also stated that offers which prices rises are much more commonly 
oversubscribed than the ones that prices fall and that an uninformed investor that 
subscribe to all offerings, “is allocated shares in the offerings that go up less frequently 
than in the offerings that decline in price” (Beatty and Ritter, 1986, pp. 215), what creates 
a “winner’s curse” situation. The authors concluded that as the ex-ante uncertainty is 
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directly related to the degree of underpricing, and as it increases the “winner’s curse” 
problem intensifies, “the greater the ex-ante uncertainty about the value of an issue, the 
greater is the expected underpricing” (Beatty & Ritter, 1986, pp. 231). They proved it 
using Rock’s (1986) model, having the inverse of the gross proceeds as a proxy to ex ante 
uncertainty. 
When analysing this problem, one important step is to find an appropriate proxy for 
risk, once as previously mentioned, it is not a measurable concept. Miller and Reilly 
(1987) on their study regarding mispricing, initial returns and uncertainty for IPOs 
assessed the relation between the level of underpricing and a couple of different proxies 
for risk, with a sample of IPO occurred between 1982 and 1983. The authors tested 
proxies already used by other authors, such as the inverse of the gross proceeds (Beatty 
and Ritter, 1986) reaching a value of 0.12, the standard deviation of returns (Ritter, 1984), 
but in this proxy they changed from the first 20 days to the first 4 days after the first day 
of trading, using in this case an ex-post measure and reaching a value of 0.32. 
Miller and Reilly (1987) also analysed the difference between the standard deviation 
of the returns for days two through five for the underpriced part of their sample, versus 
the overpriced part of the sample, concluding that there is higher uncertainty for the 
underpriced one. The authors also tested additional variables, highlighting the trading 
volume, which also showed to be correlated to uncertainty. 
The study of proxies for ex-ante uncertainty around IPOs was still not over. Clarkson 
(1994) did further research on the relation between underpricing and ex-ante uncertainty, 
stablishing a hierarchy among a group of 9 proxies, using a sample from 1976 until 1985, 
and once again, the assumptions of Rock’s (1986) models. 
After performing F-tests on all the proxies, the author highlighted 3 proxies: the age 
of the firm going public, the number of risk factors present on the prospectus and the 
standard deviation of daily returns measured over the first 59 days after the first day of 
trading. When testing these models, the author concluded that only the age of the 
company is statistically significant in all models, the number of risk factors is only in two 
of four, and the standard deviation of the daily returns it is not in all of the four.  
More recently Lowry et al. (2010) studied the variability of IPOs initial returns, using 
a sample of IPOs occurred between 1965 and 2005. With a different approach from the 
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previously studies, the authors checked if when the initial returns were high, the 
dispersion of that same returns were also high, but using information from the first 21 
trading days for both of the calculations. The authors assumed that if the dispersion of the 
initial returns is higher, then it is because the companies are harder to value. In their 
process, the authors highlighted the age of the firm, being from a high-tech industry and 
being quoted in NASDAQ instead of NYSE, as important variables to how hard it is to 
value a company. They also provide evidences backing the relation between underpricing 
and ex-ante uncertainty. 
 
 
2.2.2  Information revelation theory 
“If – as Rock assumes – some investors are better informed than either the company 
or other investors, eliciting their information before setting the price becomes one of the 
keys tasks for the investment bank taking the company public.” (Ljungqvist, 2004, pp. 
19). 
Due to this bias of information regarding the companies, previously stated by 
Ljungqvist (2004), Bookbuilding started being more used as pricing mechanism to IPOs. 
In this mechanism some investors (specifically institutional investors) can give their 
opinion on the value of the share that is about to go public. However, is in the interest of 
the investors to give misrepresentation of positive information about the company as it 
decreases the issue price, and so they will further benefit from underpricing. It was then 
a challenge to adapt this mechanism, into one where the investors benefit from revealing 
their information truthfully. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and Spatt and 
Srivastava (1991) presented the necessary changes to make this mechanism work. They 
stated that not allocating any (or few) shares to the investors who bid conservatively 
would make the investors that have positive information to bid aggressively, not only for 
being assigned to the shares but also to do not miss the opportunity of keep on doing 
businesses with the investment bank. 
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In order to this mechanism to work, i.e., to investors revealing the information, the 
shares have to be underpriced, so it can ensure that their return is positive, and then keep 
their interest in the present IPO, but also in the forthcoming ones. 
Even leaving money on the table, the issuing company still benefits from this 
mechanism, once it is able to set the higher issue price than if it did not have the positive 
information from the investors. 
 
2.2.3  Principal – agents models 
Investment banks (as underwriters) have several decisions to make in the IPO process 
that impacts the overall process. These decisions can sometimes create agency problems 
with the issuer. 
 These problems arise since the underwriters have the power to influence the offer 
price and to decide the shares allocation: to whom and how much share are allocated to 
each investor. 
Regarding the price settlement, the underwriters are hired to help choosing the highest 
offer price that ensure the selling of all the shares. Even though, the banks face moral 
hazard problems, since they can benefit from a higher offer price as the underwriting fees 
are set as a percentage of the total proceeds. These should be an incentive to underwriters 
to behave in the best interest of the issuer (higher gross proceeds means higher fees), but 
it is conceivable that other benefits1 from setting a lower offer price exceed the loss in 
underwriting fees. 
Baron and Holmström (1980) and Baron (1982) presented screening models to analyse 
the benefits of the underwriters from the underpricing. In those, they stated that in order 
to the issuers to get the best of all the superior information possessed by the investment 
bank, the investment bank should choose the offer price from a range of prices selected 
by the issuers, which the bank will choose accordingly to the expected likely demand of 
the shares from the IPO. 
                                                          
1 The benefits can arise from side-payments made by the investors to ensure they receive more 
(underpriced) shares or from allocating shares to executives in exchange of further investment banking 
business. 
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In this situation, in the presence of asymmetric information, the underwriter will a 
price other than the optimal price (from the issuer point of view) under symmetric 
information. The price chose by the underwriter, in equilibrium, will involve underpricing 
due to the information advantage of the underwriter. One important conclusion drawn 
from this mode is that the higher the uncertainty around the value of the company, the 
higher will be the asymmetry of information and so the higher the underpricing. 
 
 
2.2.4  Underpricing as a signal of company quality 
This explanation changes the approach to the problem by assuming that the issuer has 
the best information regarding it future cash-flows, and so, it value. 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) in their study concluded that good companies underprice 
in order to evidence the company’s quality, once they know that they will be able to 
recover the loss suffered through future issuings. Ibbotson (1975) was the first to suggest 
that IPOs are underpriced to “’leave a good taste in investors’ mouths’” (Ibbotson, 1975, 
pp. 264). 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) also mentioned that other signals could be used instead of 
underpricing, for highlighting the company’s quality. However, underpricing, on the 
contrary of other signals, has no monitoring costs, and it also reduces the litigation risk 
and can even work as publicity, since there are several publications and news that 
highlight the IPO winners. 
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3. Data 
 
In order to answer the questions raised by this dissertation a sample of IPO occurred 
between 2000 and 2013 was chosen and data collected from several sources. This process 
will be further fully explained. 
 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
We started by collecting all 806 IPOs occurred between the 2000 and 2013, in the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) IPOs, a highly liquid IPO market. This will allow us to 
analyse more recent IPOs, in contrast with most of previous studies that analysed periods 
before the 2000. After remove all the trusts1 we end up with 786 companies that went 
public in the NYSE between 2000 and 2013. Information about the intraday prices was 
only available for 754. Then, all IPOs that had a gross proceed lower than 100 million 
dollars were eliminated, to reduce the risk of having IPOs with misleading information 
due to their size, which left us with 633 companies. Finally, the age of the company that 
will be used as control variable, was only available to 614 companies that comprise our 
final sample. 
The list of all the companies that went public during the sample period, as well as the 
issue price and the gross proceeds of each of the respective IPO were retrieved from the 
NASDAQ website2. The intraday prices of all the transactions recorded on the first day  
of trading, that allowed us to not only to calculate the underpricing but also, and more 
important, to calculate the daily volatility, were collected from the Trade and Quotes 
(TAQ) database3 along with the volume of each transactions. In order to have the age of 
the each company we used the Capital IQ4 database for most of the companies, and the 
Google website5 for the remaining ones, since the database did not had information about 
all the companies. 
                                                          
1 Trusts’ value is dependent on the value of the assets that comprise the trust and so their price uncertainty 
is very different from a normal IPO as depend on the uncertainty regarding the price of its assets. 
2 www.nasdaq.com 
3 http://www.nyxdata.com/Data-Products/Daily-TAQ 
4 www.capitaliq.com 
5 www.google.com 
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3.2 Intraday data scrubbing 
The most decisive data to this study is the intraday prices as it is used as proxy to the 
ex-ante uncertainty and the major factor that differentiate our dissertation from previous 
studies. After downloaded all the intraday transactions that occurred in the first day after 
the IPO for each share, it was needed to scrub all the data since the data auto-recorded 
(normally called as dirty data) by computers includes a lot of inaccurate data as it records 
dozens of hundreds of values for the same day. In order to clean the data, all extreme 
values (outliers) were deleted. So when a tick change (that can happen in a matter of 
seconds, or even during the same second) was higher than 5% or higher than 1€ that 
specify data point was deleted. This was an extremely time consuming process since it 
was necessary to assess the trend of the price, every time an outlier was found.  
After removing all the dirty data, we were able to proceed with the treatment of the 
data, assembling all the transactions into 5-minutes transactions blocks. We assumed that 
for all offerings, the first transaction that occurred after the market opens would be the 
first value for the first 5-minutes block. Then, we used the transactions nearest to each 5-
minutes block, finishing at the 16.00 block, or the last value available when the share was 
not traded until 16.006.  
In the case of the volume of shares traded all transactions were considered since using 
only the 5-minutes blocks would ignore most of the transactions that happened that day 
 
3.3 Variables’ description 
The model, which will be explained in the next Section, includes de following 
variables: 
Underpricing (UND) measured as the percentage change from the issue price of an 
initial public offering and the closing price of the first day of trading in the secondary 
market, using the price of the last 5-minutes block. 
                                                          
6Companies that trade started after 12.00 or were not traded after 14.00, were classified as companies 
without proper data, and so were removed from our sample (this included a total of XXX companies). 
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Volatility (VOLA) measured as the standard deviation of the daily logarithmic returns 
measured in the first day of trading using prices from the 5-minutes blocks (Areal and 
Taylor, 2002) 
Gross proceed (GROSS) measured as the total amount obtained from the IPO (gross 
proceeds) (Beatty and Ritter, 1986) 
Volume (VOLU) measured as the percentage of the total shares issued in the public 
offering shares traded at the first day of trading (Miller and Reilly, 1987) 
Age (AGE) as the number of years since the company was founded (Ritter, 1984) 
The calculation of the realized daily volatility, based on Areal and Taylor (2002) as 
previously mentioned, followed the following formula: 
 
 
𝜎2 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑗 ∗ 𝑟𝑗
2
𝑛
𝑗=0
 (3.1) 
Where: 
     𝑤𝑗  is the weight of each 5-minutes return during the day. In this study is assumed to 
be equal for every return. Their sum is equal to 1; 
     𝑟𝑗
2 is the square of the logarithmic returns for each of the 5-minutes. 
From the values computed from the previous formula, we calculated their square root 
in order to reach the standard deviation, the proxy used for the ex-ante uncertainty. 
For the purpose of this study, the variables GROSS and AGE were transformed. 
GROSS into the inverse of GROSS while AGE into the log (1+AGE). This transformation 
was done in the line of previous studies7.  
 
 
                                                          
7 The transformation done on GROSS was done by Beatty and Ritter (1986) and the one done on AGE was 
done by Ritter (1984). 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
As shown in Table 1 the average offer price was $18.47 (the median is $18) with a 
minimum value of $6 in the IPOs of both Agere Systems Inc. and Medialive International 
Inc., a maximum value of $70.41 in the IPO of Kinder Morgan Kansas Inc. and a standard 
deviation of $6.67. Relatively to the closing price of the first day of trading, the average 
(median) was $20.84 ($19.1), the standard deviation $10.06, and it ranged from $6 in the 
case of Medialive International Inc. to $132.7 in the case of NYMEX Holdings Inc..  
The average (median) underpricing was 11.45% (5.66%) with a minimum of -26.79%, 
an overpriced IPO by Agria Corp., and a maximum of 165.94% in an IPO by Youku 
Tudou Inc.  
In respect to the daily volatility of the first day of trading, the sample present an 
average (median) of 5.07% (4.09%) with the less volatile being the shares of Campus 
Crest Communities Inc with 0.41% and the most volatile the shares of Pandora Media 
Inc. with 29.59%. 
The IPO raised on average (median) $520.27 million ($255.45million), being the 
largest one the VISA IPO with gross proceeds of $17,864 million. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
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During the first day of trading after the IPO an average (median) of 65.18% (58.01%) 
of the shares offered in the IPI were traded. In the case of LinkedIn Corp. the number of 
shares traded were 3.84 times the total number of shares offered.  
Finally, the companies that went public were founded, on average (median) 22 years 
(9 years) before. It’s important to mention that 71 companies went public in the same year 
that they were founded and one of the companies (Bunge LTD) did its IPO 183 years 
after it was founded. 
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4. Methodology 
 
Before we present our model, it is important to mention that when testing it we are 
facing a joint hypothesis problem as we are assuming that the daily volatility is a good 
proxy for uncertainty regarding the true value of the shares offered in the IPO. 
Several justifications have been tested to try to solve the IPO underpricing puzzle and  
this study pretend to test the asymmetric information justification that, as first proposed 
by Beatty and Ritter (1986). According to these authors, the asymmetric information 
creates a winner’s curse situation, which, as previously mentioned, happens due to 
uncertainty around the pricing of the company going public. As the offer price is partially 
supported in the fact that uninformed investor tend to evaluate the IPO shares downwards, 
what leads the company to apply a discount in the price of the share in order to guarantee 
the success of the offering. 
In order to test this justification we propose the following linear regression model: 
 
 
𝑈𝑁𝐷 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2 ∗ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴 +  𝛽3 ∗
1
𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑆
+  𝛽4 ∗ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑈 +  𝛽5 ∗ log (1 + 𝐴𝐺𝐸) (4.1) 
 
In this model, the underpricing (UND) is our dependent variable, the daily volatility 
(VOLA) is our explanatory variable, as previously mentioned, and the three remaining 
variables are control variables that were shown can influence the underpricing by 
previous studies, being: the inverse of the gross proceeds obtained from the offering, 
suggested by Beatty and Ritter (1986); the percentage of shares trade in the first day when 
compared to the total amount of shares issued in the offering, suggested by Miller and 
Reilly (1987); and finally the logarithmic of 1 plus the age of the company when it went 
public. We expected that the signal of VOLA, of VOLU and of AGE (and of it 
transformation) to be positive, expecting a positive relation between them and the 
underpricing (UND). Regarding the GROSS, once we transformed the variable into the 
inverse of GROSS, we expect the signal to be negative, but the relation between GROSS 
and underpricing (UND) to be positive. 
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5. Results 
Since we checked that there is heteroscedasticity in the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression, we proceed to validate the statistical inference using the White’s consistent 
estimators of the variance and covariance matrix from the OLS estimators of the 
regression coefficients. 
In Table 2, we present the results of the OLS regression1, where the underpricing is 
the dependent variable and the daily realized volatility is the explanatory variable. The 
volume, the gross proceeds and the age are control variables, from which the last two 
were transformed as previously mentioned. 
 
 
                                                          
1 Since we checked that there is heteroscedasticity in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, we 
proceed to validate the statistical inference using the White’s consistent estimators of the variance and 
covariance matrix from the OLS estimators of the regression coefficients. 
Table 2 – Regressions for a Sample of 614 NYSE IPOs from 
the Period 2000 – 2013.a) 
a)      Adjusted t-values (White's consistent covariance and variance matrix is used to estimating 
standard errors) 
*** Significant at 1% level 
**   Significant at 5% level   
*     Significant at 10% level 
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The positive coefficient on the realized volatility are consistent with Rock’s (1986) 
prepositions, which predicted that the ex-ante uncertainty is positively correlated with the 
underpricing, being in this case the daily realized volatility the proxy for ex-ante 
uncertainty. Regarding the control variables, the volume and the age have a positive 
correlation with the dependent variable, and the inverse of the gross proceed has a 
negative correlation, what means that the gross proceeds itself has a positive correlation 
also.  
Related to the statistical significance, the volatility and the volume are significant at 
1% level in all models. Regarding the inverse of gross proceeds and the logarithm 
transformation of the age of the companies, the first is statistically significant at 5% and 
10% level in model 3 and 4, respectively; while the second is statistically significant at 
5% in model 4. 
It is important to state that the adjusted R-squared is quite high (0.373), even for model 
1, where it is only present the explanatory variable, the daily realized volatility. When 
comparing to other similar studies, namely Miller and Reilly (1987), we found higher 
explanatory power to the standard deviation, but we have calculated the volatility in the 
first day only, while Miller and Reilly used the first 4 days after the IPO. Clarkson (1994), 
conclude that the standard deviation had no statistical significance in his study, but again, 
he used the standard deviation during the first 60 days of trading after the IPO.  
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6. Conclusions 
 
Although there is a vast number of studies regarding the IPO underpricing, the number 
of studies about the uncertainty, more specifically about the winner’s curse, as a motive 
for the underpricing is relatively scarce. This study tries to fill this gap by using a different 
proxy for uncertainty, the volatility during the first day of trading after the IPO (daily 
standard deviation) and by using a more recent sample that starts in 2000 and ends in 
2013. 
The first result of our study is consistent with previous studies as it shows an average 
underpricing of 11.45%. 
Regarding uncertainty as a justification for underpricing, our results, show a positive 
relationship between underpricing and uncertainty. This results is consistent with other 
studies (Ritter (1984); Miller and Reilly (1987)) that although using different periods of 
time to calculate the standard deviation (first twenty days after the IPO and from the 
second to fifth day after the IPO) found similar results. Clarkson (1994) using as a proxy 
for uncertainty the standard deviation from the second to the sixtieth day after the IPO 
found slightly different results which may be justified by the difference in the number of 
days used to calculate the standard deviation.  
Although our sample was very large (614 companies) it is important to mention that 
only includes IPO occurred in NYSE and so misses a large number of offerings from two 
other very important stock exchanges: the NASDAQ and the AMEX. The inclusion of 
the IPOs occurred in theses stock exchanges would allow us to extend our conclusions to 
the entire north-American IPO market. Another limitation of our study is the joint 
hypothesis problem since we assume that the daily volatility is a good proxy for value 
uncertainty. 
 One possibility to extend the sample is to include earlier years and analyse the 
differences between different and more crucial periods, e.g., the dot-com bubble and even 
the recent economic crisis.  
 
 
 19 
 
7. References 
 
Allen, F. & Faulhaber, G. R. (1989), "Signalling by underpricing in the IPO market", 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.  303-323. 
 
Areal, N. M. P. C. & Taylor, S. J. (2002), "The realized volatility of FTSE-100 futures 
prices", Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 22, No. 7, pp.  627-648. 
 
Baron, D. P. (1982), "A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and 
Distribution Services for New Issues", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp.  955-
976. 
 
Baron, D. P. & HolmstrÖM, B. (1980), "The Investment Banking Contract For New 
Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation And The Incentive Problem", The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 35, No. 5, pp.  1115-1138. 
 
Beatty, R. P. & Ritter, J. R. (1986), "Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing 
of initial public offerings", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 15, No. 1–2, pp.  213-
232. 
 
Benveniste, L. M. & Spindt, P. A. (1989), "How investment bankers determine the offer 
price and allocation of new issues", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp.  
343-361. 
 
Benveniste, L. M. & Wilhelm, W. J. (1990), "A comparative analysis of IPO proceeds 
under alternative regulatory environments", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 28, 
No. 1, pp.  173-207. 
 
Clarkson, P. M. (1994), "The underpricing of initial public offerings, ex ante uncertainty, 
and proxy selection", Accounting & Finance, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp.  67-78. 
 
 20 
 
Ibbotson, R. G. (1975), "Price performance of common stock new issues", Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp.  235-272. 
 
Ibbotson, R. G. & Jaffe, J. F. (1975), "“Hot issue” markets", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
30, No. 4, pp.  1027-1042. 
 
Ibbotson, R. G., Sindelar, J. L. & Ritter, J. R. (1994), "The market’s problems with the 
pricing of initial public offerings", Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 7, No. 1, 
pp.  66-74. 
 
Koh, F. & Walter, T. (1989), "A direct test of Rock's model of the pricing of unseasoned 
issues", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp.  251-272. 
 
Ljungqvist, A. (2004), "IPO underpricing", in Empirical Corporate Finance,  Eckbo, B. 
E. (ed.) Handbook in Corporate Finance, Vol. 1, pp. 375-422, North-Holland. 
 
Lowry, M., Officer, M. S. & Schwert, G. W. (2010), "The Variability of IPO Initial 
Returns", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 65, No. 2, pp.  425-465. 
 
Miller, R. E. & Reilly, F. K. (1987), "An Examination of Mispricing, Returns, and 
Uncertainty for Initial Public Offerings", Financial Management, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp.  33-
38. 
 
Ritter, J. R. (1984), "The "Hot Issue" Market of 1980", The Journal of Business, Vol. 57, 
No. 2, pp.  215-240. 
 
Ritter, J. R. (2011), "Equilibrium in the Initial Public Offerings Market", Annual Review 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp.  347-374. 
 
Rock, K. (1986), "Why new issues are underpriced", Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 15, No. 1, pp.  187-212. 
 
 21 
 
Spatt, C. & Srivastava, S. (1991), "Preplay Communication, Participation Restrictions, 
and Efficiency in Initial Public Offerings", Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, 
pp.  709-726. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
Appendix 
 
In this list are presented the name and the ticker of all the companies that went public 
during the period between 2000 and 2013 in the New York Stock Exchange, giving the 
final 614 companies selected for our sample. In order to reach the final sample we 
removed all the trusts from the initial sample, keeping only 786 companies from the initial 
806. Then we had to remove the companies we were lacking information regarding the 
intraday prices, diminishing the sample to 754 companies. In order to eliminate possible 
outliers due to their sizer, we decided to keep only companies with gross proceeds equal 
or higher than 100 million dollars, keeping 633 companies. Finally, when collecting 
information regarding the age of the companies, we could not find information for all the 
companies, reaching the final number of 614 companies. 
 
  Company  Ticker 
1 3PAR INC. PAR 
2 58.COM INC. WUBA 
3 7 DAYS GROUP HOLDINGS LTD SVN 
4 AAMES INVESTMENT CORP AIC 
5 ACCENTURE PLC ACN 
6 ACORN INTERNATIONAL, INC. ATV 
7 ACTIVE NETWORK LLC ACTV 
8 ADESA INC KAR 
9 ADVANCE AMERICA, CASH ADVANCE CENTERS, INC. AEA 
10 AECOM ACM 
11 AEGEAN MARINE PETROLEUM NETWORK INC. ANW 
12 AERCAP HOLDINGS N.V. AER 
13 AEROFLEX HOLDING CORP. ARX 
14 AGERE SYSTEMS INC AGR'A 
15 AGRIA CORP GRO 
16 AIR LEASE CORP AL 
17 AIRCASTLE LTD AYR 
18 ALCON INC ACL 
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19 ALLIANCE DATA SYSTEMS CORP ADS 
20 ALLIED WORLD ASSURANCE CO HOLDINGS, AG AWH 
21 ALLISON TRANSMISSION HOLDINGS INC ALSN 
22 ALON USA ENERGY, INC. ALJ 
23 ALON USA PARTNERS, LP ALDW 
24 ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES, INC. FCL 
25 ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES, INC./OLD ANR 
26 AMBOW EDUCATION HOLDING LTD. AMBO 
27 AMC ENTERTAINMENT HOLDINGS, INC. AMC 
28 AMERICAN CAMPUS COMMUNITIES INC ACC 
29 AMERICAN EQUITY INVESTMENT LIFE HOLDING CO AEL 
30 AMERICAN HOMES 4 RENT AMH 
31 AMERICAN RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES, INC. ARPI 
32 AMERICAN WATER WORKS COMPANY, INC. AWK 
33 AMN HEALTHCARE SERVICES INC AHS 
34 ANTEON INTERNATIONAL CORP ANT 
35 ANTERO RESOURCES CORP AR 
36 ANTHEM, INC. ATH 
37 APOLLO COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCE, INC. ARI 
38 APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT LLC APO 
39 APOLLO RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE, INC. AMTG 
40 AQUILA MERCHANT SERVICE INC ILA 
41 ARAMARK ARMK 
42 ARAMARK CORP/DE RMK 
43 ARC DOCUMENT SOLUTIONS, INC. ARP 
44 ARC LOGISTICS PARTNERS LP ARCX 
45 ARCOS DORADOS HOLDINGS INC. ARCO 
46 ARDMORE SHIPPING CORP ASC 
47 ARES COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE CORP ACRE 
48 ARLINGTON TANKERS LTD. ATB 
49 ARMADA HOFFLER PROPERTIES, INC. AHH 
50 ARTIO GLOBAL INVESTORS INC. ART 
51 ARTISAN PARTNERS ASSET MANAGEMENT INC. APAM 
52 ASBURY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP INC ABG 
53 ASPEN INSURANCE HOLDINGS LTD AHL 
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54 ASSURANT INC AIZ 
55 ASSURED GUARANTY LTD AGO 
56 AT&T CORP AWE 
57 ATHLON ENERGY INC. ATHL 
58 ATLAS ENERGY RESOURCES, LLC ATN 
59 AUTOHOME INC. ATHM 
60 AVENTINE RENEWABLE ENERGY HOLDINGS INC AVR 
61 AVG TECHNOLOGIES N.V. AVG 
62 AVIANCA HOLDINGS S.A. AVH 
63 AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LTD AXS 
64 BALTIC TRADING LTD BALT 
65 BANCO SANTANDER (BRASIL) S.A. BSBR 
66 BANKRATE, INC. RATE 
67 BANKUNITED, INC. BKU 
68 BASIC ENERGY SERVICES INC BAS 
69 BELMOND LTD. OEH 
70 BERRY PLASTICS GROUP INC BERY 
71 BILL BARRETT CORP BBG 
72 BITAUTO HOLDINGS LTD BITA 
73 BLACKSTONE GROUP L.P. BX 
74 BLUE CAPITAL REINSURANCE HOLDINGS LTD. BCRH 
75 BLUELINX HOLDINGS INC. BXC 
76 BOARDWALK PIPELINE PARTNERS, LP BWP 
77 BOIS D'ARC ENERGY, INC. BDE 
78 BOISE CASCADE CO BCC 
79 BONANZA CREEK ENERGY, INC. BCEI 
80 BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON HOLDING CORP BAH 
81 BOX SHIPS INC. TEU 
82 BRIDGEPOINT EDUCATION INC BPI 
83 BRIGHT HORIZONS FAMILY SOLUTIONS INC. BFAM 
84 BRISTOL WEST HOLDINGS INC BRW 
85 BRITANNIA BULK HOLDINGS INC DWT 
86 BRIXMOR PROPERTY GROUP INC. BRX 
87 BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING INC. BKD 
88 BUCKEYE GP HOLDINGS L.P. BGH 
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89 BUILD A BEAR WORKSHOP INC BBW 
90 BUNGE LTD BG 
91 BURLINGTON STORES, INC. BURL 
92 BWAY HOLDING CO BWY 
93 C&J ENERGY SERVICES, INC. CJES 
94 CABELAS INC CAB 
95 CAL DIVE INTERNATIONAL, INC. DVR 
96 CAMELOT INFORMATION SYSTEMS INC. CIS 
97 CAMPUS CREST COMMUNITIES, INC. CCG 
98 CAPITALSOURCE INC CSE 
99 CARTERS INC CRI 
100 CASCAL N.V. HOO 
101 CBOT HOLDINGS INC BOT 
102 CBRE GROUP, INC. CBG 
103 CELANESE CORP CE 
104 CELLCOM ISRAEL LTD. CEL 
105 CELLU TISSUE HOLDINGS, INC. CLU 
106 CEMENTOS PACASMAYO SAA CPAC 
107 CENCOSUD S.A. CNCO 
108 CENTRO SATURN MERGERSUB LLC. HTG 
109 CF INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS, INC. CF 
110 CHANGE HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC. EM 
111 CHARLES RIVER LABORATORIES INTERNATIONAL INC CRL 
112 CHEGG, INC CHGG 
113 CHERRY HILL MORTGAGE INVESTMENT CORP CHMI 
114 CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP CHKR 
115 CHIMERA INVESTMENT CORP CIM 
116 CHINA DIGITAL TV HOLDING CO., LTD. STV 
117 CHINA LIFE INSURANCE CO LTD LFC 
118 CHINA NEPSTAR CHAIN DRUGSTORE LTD. NPD 
119 CHINA NETCOM GROUP CORP (HONG KONG) LTD CN 
120 CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL INC CMG 
121 CHUNGHWA TELECOM CO LTD CHT 
122 CINEMARK HOLDINGS, INC. CNK 
123 CIT GROUP INC CIT 
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124 CITADEL BROADCASTING CORP CDL 
125 CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR HOLDINGS, INC. CCO 
126 CLOUD PEAK ENERGY INC. CLD 
127 CLUBCORP HOLDINGS, INC. MYCC 
128 CNX GAS CORP CXG 
129 COACH INC COH 
130 COBALT INTERNATIONAL ENERGY, INC. CIE 
131 COLFAX CORP CFX 
132 COLONY CAPITAL, INC. CLNY 
133 COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS INC CYH 
134 COMPASS MINERALS INTERNATIONAL INC CMP 
135 CONCHO RESOURCES INC CXO 
136 CONCORD MEDICAL SERVICES HOLDINGS LTD CCM 
137 CONSTELLIUM N.V. CSTM 
138 CONTAINER STORE GROUP, INC. TCS 
139 CONTINENTAL RESOURCES, INC CLR 
140 
CONTROLADORA VUELA COMPANIA DE AVIACION, S.A.B. DE 
C.V. 
VLRS 
141 COPA HOLDINGS, S.A. CPA 
142 CORESITE REALTY CORP COR 
143 COSAN LTD. CZZ 
144 COSTAMARE INC. CMRE 
145 COTY INC. COTY 
146 CPFL ENERGY INC CPL 
147 CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM PARTNERS LP NRGM 
148 CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM PARTNERS LP KGS 
149 CREXUS INVESTMENT CORP. CXS 
150 CROSSAMERICA PARTNERS LP LGP 
151 CRUDE CARRIERS CORP. CRU 
152 CRYSTAL RIVER CAPITAL, INC. CRZ 
153 CUBESMART YSI 
154 CV HOLDINGS, INC. CBF 
155 CVENT INC CVT 
156 CVR ENERGY INC CVI 
157 CVR PARTNERS, LP UAN 
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158 CVR REFINING, LP CVRR 
159 CYS INVESTMENTS, INC. CYS 
160 DANAOS CORP DAC 
161 DCP MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LP DPM 
162 DELEK LOGISTICS PARTNERS, LP DKL 
163 DELEK US HOLDINGS, INC. DK 
164 DELPHI AUTOMOTIVE PLC DLPH 
165 DEMAND MEDIA INC. DMD 
166 DEX MEDIA INC DEX 
167 DHI GROUP, INC. DHX 
168 DHT HOLDINGS, INC. DHT 
169 DIAMOND RESORTS INTERNATIONAL, INC. DRII 
170 DIAMONDROCK HOSPITALITY CO DRH 
171 DIANA SHIPPING INC. DSX 
172 DIGITALGLOBE, INC. DGI 
173 DJO OPCO HOLDINGS, INC. DJO 
174 DOLAN CO. DM 
175 DOLBY LABORATORIES, INC. DLB 
176 DOLE FOOD CO INC DOLE 
177 DOLLAR GENERAL CORP DG 
178 DOMINOS PIZZA INC DPZ 
179 DOUGLAS DYNAMICS, INC PLOW 
180 DOUGLAS EMMETT INC DEI 
181 DRESSER-RAND GROUP INC. DRC 
182 DSW INC. DSW 
183 DUFF & PHELPS CORP DUF 
184 DUNCAN ENERGY PARTNERS L.P. DEP 
185 DUPONT FABROS TECHNOLOGY, INC. DFT 
186 DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL INC. DCP 
187 ECC CAPITAL CORP ECR 
188 E-COMMERCE CHINA DANGDANG INC. DANG 
189 EDENOR EDN 
190 EDGEN GROUP INC. EDG 
191 E-HOUSE (CHINA) HOLDINGS LTD EJ 
192 EL PASO PIPELINE PARTNERS, L.P. EPB 
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193 ELLINGTON FINANCIAL LLC EFC 
194 EMERGE ENERGY SERVICES LP EMES 
195 EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES L.P. EMS 
196 EMERGENT CAPITAL, INC. IFT 
197 EMPLOYERS HOLDINGS, INC. EIG 
198 ENCORE ACQUISITION CO EAC 
199 ENCORE ENERGY PARTNERS LP ENP 
200 ENDURANCE SPECIALTY HOLDINGS LTD ENH 
201 ENERGY CORP OF AMERICA, INC ECT 
202 ENERGY TRANSFER EQUITY, L.P. ETE 
203 ENERGYSOLUTIONS, INC. ES 
204 ENERSYS ENS 
205 ENTERPRISE GP HOLDINGS L.P. EPE 
206 ENTRAVISION COMMUNICATIONS CORP EVC 
207 ENVISION HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC. EVHC 
208 EQT MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LP EQM 
209 ESH HOSPITALITY, INC. STAY 
210 ESSENT GROUP LTD. ESNT 
211 EVERBANK FINANCIAL CORP EVER 
212 EVERI HOLDINGS INC. GCA 
213 EVERTEC, INC. EVTC 
214 EXACTTARGET, INC. ET 
215 EXAMWORKS GROUP, INC. EXAM 
216 EXCO RESOURCES INC XCO 
217 EXPRESS, INC. EXPR 
218 EXPRESSJET HOLDINGS INC XJT 
219 EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC. EXR 
220 FIDELITY & GUARANTY LIFE FGL 
221 FIRST MERCURY FINANCIAL CORP FMR 
222 FLAGSTONE REINSURANCE HOLDINGS, S.A. FSR 
223 FLEETCOR TECHNOLOGIES INC FLT 
224 FLEETMATICS GROUP PLC FLTX 
225 FLY LEASING LTD FLY 
226 FMC TECHNOLOGIES INC FTI 
227 FORTRESS INVESTMENT GROUP LLC FIG 
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228 FORUM ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES, INC. FET 
229 FRANK'S INTERNATIONAL N.V. FI 
230 FREESCALE SEMICONDUCTOR INC FSL 
231 FREESCALE SEMICONDUCTOR, LTD. FSL 
232 FTD GROUP, INC. FTD 
233 FUSION-IO, INC. FIO 
234 FXCM INC. FXCM 
235 GAFISA S.A. GFA 
236 GAMESTOP HOLDINGS CORP GME 
237 GASLOG LTD. GLOG 
238 GATEHOUSE MEDIA, INC. GHS 
239 GENERAL MOTORS CO GM 
240 GENESIS HEALTHCARE, INC. SKH 
241 GENESIS LEASE LTD GLS 
242 GENON ENERGY, INC. RRI 
243 GENPACT LTD G 
244 GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC GNW 
245 GIANT INTERACTIVE GROUP INC. GA 
246 GIGAMON INC. GIMO 
247 GLOBAL PARTNERS LP GLP 
248 GLOBAL SIGNAL INC GSL 
249 GNC HOLDINGS, INC. GNC 
250 GOL INTELLIGENT AIRLINES INC. GOL 
251 GOODMAN GLOBAL INC GGL 
252 GRAHAM PACKAGING CO INC. GRM 
253 GRANA & MONTERO S.A.A. GRAM 
254 GREEN DOT CORP GDOT 
255 GUIDEWIRE SOFTWARE, INC. GWRE 
256 GUSHAN ENVIRONMENTAL ENERGY LTD GU 
257 HANCOCK JOHN FINANCIAL SERVICES INC JHF 
258 
HANNON ARMSTRONG SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE 
CAPITAL, INC. 
HASI 
259 HATTERAS FINANCIAL CORP HTS 
260 HCA HOLDINGS, INC. HCA 
261 HEALTHSPRING, INC. HS 
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262 HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS INC HPY 
263 HERBALIFE LTD. HLF 
264 HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS INC HTZ 
265 HEWITT ASSOCIATES INC HEW 
266 HFF, INC. HF 
267 HHGREGG, INC. HGG 
268 HI-CRUSH PARTNERS LP HCLP 
269 HIGHER ONE HOLDINGS, INC. ONE 
270 HIGHLAND HOSPITALITY CORP HIH 
271 HILLTOP HOLDINGS INC. ARC 
272 HILTON WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS INC. HLT 
273 HOLLY ENERGY PARTNERS LP HEP 
274 HOMEBANC CORP HMB 
275 HOMEX DEVELOPMENT CORP. HXM 
276 HORIZON LINES, INC. HRZ 
277 HUDSON PACIFIC PROPERTIES, INC. HPP 
278 HUNTSMAN CORP HUN 
279 HUTCHISON TELECOMMUNICATIONS INTERNATIONAL LTD HTX 
280 HYATT HOTELS CORP H 
281 ICICI BANK LTD IBN 
282 IGATE COMPUTER SYSTEMS LTD PTI 
283 IHS INC. IHS 
284 INFOBLOX INC BLOX 
285 INFRASOURCE SERVICES INC IFS 
286 INTEGRATED DEFENSE TECHNOLOGIES INC IDE 
287 INTELSAT S.A. I 
288 INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE HOLDINGS, INC. ICE 
289 INTERLINE BRANDS, INC./DE IBI 
290 INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE HOLDINGS, INC. ISE 
291 INTERXION HOLDING N.V. INXN 
292 INTRALINKS HOLDINGS, INC. IL 
293 INTREPID POTASH, INC. IPI 
294 INTREXON CORP XON 
295 INVESCO MORTGAGE CAPITAL INC. IVR 
296 IOWA TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES INC IWA 
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297 ISOFTSTONE HOLDINGS LTD ISS 
298 ITC HOLDINGS CORP. ITC 
299 J CREW GROUP INC JCG 
300 JACKSON HEWITT TAX SERVICE INC JTX 
301 JAVELIN MORTGAGE INVESTMENT CORP. JMI 
302 JONES ENERGY, INC. JONE 
303 JORGENSEN EARLE M CO /DE/ JOR 
304 JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC JRN 
305 K12 INC LRN 
306 KAR AUCTION SERVICES, INC. KAR 
307 KBR, INC. KBR 
308 KBW, LLC. KBW 
309 KINDER MORGAN KANSAS, INC. KMR 
310 KINDER MORGAN, INC. KMI 
311 KINETIC CONCEPTS INC KCI 
312 KKR FINANCIAL CORP KFN 
313 KMG AMERICA CORP KMA 
314 KNOLL INC KNL 
315 KNOT OFFSHORE PARTNERS LP KNOP 
316 KOPPERS HOLDINGS INC. KOP 
317 KOSMOS ENERGY LTD. KOS 
318 KRATON PERFORMANCE POLYMERS, INC. KRA 
319 LAREDO PETROLEUM, INC. LPI 
320 LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP LVS 
321 LAZARD LTD LAZ 
322 LDK SOLAR CO., LTD. LDK 
323 LEAPFROG ENTERPRISES INC LF 
324 LEIDOS HOLDINGS, INC. SAI 
325 LG DISPLAY CO., LTD. LPL 
326 LIFE TIME FITNESS, INC. LTM 
327 LIFELOCK, INC. LOCK 
328 LIN TV CORP. TVL 
329 LINKEDIN CORP LNKD 
330 LOEWS CORP CG 
331 LONE PINE RESOURCES INC. LPR 
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332 LONGTOP FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES LTD LFT 
333 LRR ENERGY, L.P. LRE 
334 LUMBER LIQUIDATORS HOLDINGS, INC. LL 
335 LUMINENT MORTGAGE CAPITAL INC LUM 
336 MACRO BANK INC. BMA 
337 MAGELLAN MIDSTREAM HOLDINGS LP MGG 
338 MAGNACHIP SEMICONDUCTOR CORP MX 
339 MAIDENFORM BRANDS LLC MFB 
340 MANCHESTER UNITED PLC MANU 
341 MANNING & NAPIER, INC. MN 
342 MANUFACTURERS SERVICES LTD MSV 
343 MARIN SOFTWARE INC MRIN 
344 MARINER ENERGY INC ME 
345 MASTERCARD INC MA 
346 MATADOR RESOURCES CO MTDR 
347 MAXCOM TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC MXT 
348 MEAD JOHNSON NUTRITION CO MJN 
349 MECHEL PAO MTL 
350 MEDIALIVE INTERNATIONAL INC KME 
351 MEDICAL STAFFING NETWORK HOLDINGS INC MRN 
352 METLIFE INC MET 
353 MF GLOBAL HOLDINGS LTD. MF 
354 MICHAEL KORS HOLDINGS LTD KORS 
355 MIDCOAST ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P. MEP 
356 MIDSTATES PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC. MPO 
357 MILLENNIAL MEDIA INC. MM 
358 MINDRAY MEDICAL INTERNATIONAL LTD MR 
359 MIRANT CORP SOE 
360 MISTRAS GROUP, INC. MG 
361 MITTAL STEEL USA INC. ISG 
362 MIX TELEMATICS LTD MIXT 
363 MODEL N, INC. MODN 
364 MOLYCORP, INC. MCP 
365 MONSANTO CO MON 
366 MONTPELIER RE HOLDINGS LTD MRH 
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367 MORTGAGEIT HOLDINGS, INC. MHL 
368 MORTON'S RESTAURANT GROUP INC MRT 
369 MPLX LP MPLX 
370 MRC GLOBAL INC. MRC 
371 MSCI INC. MXB 
372 MUELLER WATER PRODUCTS, INC. MWA 
373 MYKROLIS CORP MYK 
374 NALCO HOLDING CO NLC 
375 NATIONAL BANK HOLDINGS CORP NBHC 
376 NATIONAL FINANCIAL PARTNERS CORP NFP 
377 NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE HOLDINGS INC. NSM 
378 NATURAL GROCERS BY VITAMIN COTTAGE, INC. NGVC 
379 NAVIGATOR HOLDINGS LTD. NVGS 
380 NAVIOS MARITIME ACQUISITION CORP NNA.U 
381 NAVIOS MARITIME PARTNERS L.P. NMM 
382 NAVTEQ CORP NVT 
383 NELNET INC NNI 
384 NETEZZA CORP NZ 
385 NETSUITE INC N 
386 NEUSTAR INC NSR 
387 NEW CENTURY FINANCIAL CORP NEW 
388 NEW ORIENTAL EDUCATION & TECHNOLOGY GROUP INC. EDU 
389 NEW SKIES SATELLITES HOLDINGS LTD. NSE 
390 NEW YORK & COMPANY, INC. NWY 
391 NEWPOWER HOLDINGS INC NPW 
392 NIELSEN HOLDINGS PLC NLSN 
393 NIMBLE STORAGE INC NMBL 
394 NISKA GAS STORAGE PARTNERS LLC NKA 
395 NOAH EDUCATION HOLDINGS LTD. NED 
396 NOAH HOLDINGS LTD NOAH 
397 NORCRAFT COMPANIES, INC. NCFT 
398 NORTHERN TIER ENERGY LP NTI 
399 NORTHSTAR REALTY FINANCE CORP. NRF 
400 NRG ENERGY, INC. NRG 
401 NRG YIELD, INC. NYLD 
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402 NUSTAR GP HOLDINGS, LLC VEH 
403 NYMEX HOLDINGS INC NMX 
404 OAKTREE CAPITAL GROUP, LLC OAK 
405 OASIS PETROLEUM INC. OAS 
406 OCH-ZIFF CAPITAL MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC OZM 
407 OCI PARTNERS LP OCIP 
408 ODYSSEY RE HOLDINGS CORP ORH 
409 OILTANKING PARTNERS, L.P. OILT 
410 ONEBEACON INSURANCE GROUP, LTD. OB 
411 ONEMAIN HOLDINGS, INC. LEAF 
412 ORBITZ WORLDWIDE, INC. OWW 
413 ORION POWER HOLDINGS INC ORN 
414 OSG AMERICA L.P. OSP 
415 OWENS CORNING OC 
416 PAA NATURAL GAS STORAGE LP PNG 
417 PACIFIC AIRPORT GROUP PAC 
418 PANAMSAT HOLDING CORP PA 
419 PANDORA MEDIA, INC. P 
420 PBF ENERGY INC. PBF 
421 PENN VIRGINIA GP HOLDINGS, L.P. PVG 
422 PENNYMAC FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. PFSI 
423 PETROLOGISTICS LP PDH 
424 PHILLIPS 66 PARTNERS LP PSXP 
425 PHOENIX NEW MEDIA LTD FENG 
426 PIKE CORP PEC 
427 PINNACLE FOODS INC. PF 
428 PIONEER SOUTHWEST ENERGY PARTNERS L.P. PSE 
429 PLAINS GP HOLDINGS LP PAGP 
430 PLATINUM UNDERWRITERS HOLDINGS LTD PTP 
431 PLY GEM HOLDINGS INC PGEM 
432 POLYPORE INTERNATIONAL, INC. PPO 
433 PREMCOR INC PCO 
434 PRESTIGE BRANDS HOLDINGS, INC. PBH 
435 PRIMERICA, INC. PRI 
436 PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC PFG 
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437 PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SERVICES INC PFS 
438 PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC PRU 
439 PZENA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC. PZN 
440 QEP MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LP QEPM 
441 QIAO XING MOBILE COMMUNICATION CO., LTD. QXM 
442 QIHOO 360 TECHNOLOGY CO LTD QIHU 
443 QIMONDA AG QI 
444 QUINTILES TRANSNATIONAL HOLDINGS INC. Q 
445 RACKSPACE HOSTING, INC. RAX 
446 RAILAMERICA INC /DE RA 
447 RE/MAX HOLDINGS, INC. RMAX 
448 REALD INC. RLD 
449 REALOGY HOLDINGS CORP. RLGY 
450 REDDY ICE HOLDINGS INC FRZ 
451 REFCO INC. RFX 
452 REGAL ENTERTAINMENT GROUP RGC 
453 RENESOLA LTD SOL 
454 RENREN INC. RENN 
455 RENTECH NITROGEN PARTNERS, L.P. RNF 
456 RESTORATION HARDWARE HOLDINGS INC RH 
457 RETAIL PROPERTIES OF AMERICA, INC. RPAI 
458 REXFORD INDUSTRIAL REALTY, INC. REXR 
459 REXNORD CORP RXN 
460 RIBAPHARM INC RNA 
461 RISKMETRICS GROUP INC RMG 
462 ROADRUNNER TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, INC. RRTS 
463 ROCKWOOD HOLDINGS, INC. ROC 
464 ROSE ROCK MIDSTREAM, L.P. RRMS 
465 ROSETTA STONE INC RST 
466 ROUNDY'S, INC. RNDY 
467 RSC HOLDINGS INC. RRR 
468 RUCKUS WIRELESS INC RKUS 
469 SAFE BULKERS, INC. SB 
470 SALESFORCE.COM INC CRM 
471 SANCHEZ ENERGY CORP SN 
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472 SCORPIO BULKERS INC. SALT 
473 SCORPIO TANKERS INC. STNG 
474 SEADRILL PARTNERS LLC SDLP 
475 SEALY CORP ZZ 
476 SEASPAN CORP SSW 
477 SEAWORLD ENTERTAINMENT, INC. SEAS 
478 SELECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS CORP SEM 
479 SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING INTERNATIONAL CORP SMI 
480 SENSATA TECHNOLOGIES HOLDING N.V. ST 
481 SERVICENOW, INC. NOW 
482 SILVERLINE TECHNOLOGIES LTD SLT 
483 SIMCERE PHARMACEUTICAL GROUP SCR 
484 SIRVA INC SIR 
485 SOLARWINDS, INC. SWI 
486 SOLERA HOLDINGS, INC SLH 
487 SOUFUN HOLDINGS LTD SFUN 
488 SOUTHCROSS ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P. SXE 
489 SPECTRA ENERGY PARTNERS, LP SEP 
490 SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC. SPR 
491 SPIRIT FINANCE CORPORATION SFC 
492 SPIRIT REALTY CAPITAL, INC. SRC 
493 SPN FAIRWAY ACQUISITION, INC. CPX 
494 SPRAGUE RESOURCES LP SRLP 
495 STAG INDUSTRIAL, INC. STIR 
496 STEWART W P & CO LTD WPL 
497 STONEGATE MORTGAGE CORP SGM 
498 STR HOLDINGS, INC. STRI 
499 STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS, INC SLH 
500 SUMMIT HOTEL PROPERTIES, INC. INN 
501 SUMMIT MIDSTREAM PARTNERS, LP SMLP 
502 SUNCOKE ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P. SXCP 
503 SUNCOKE ENERGY, INC. SXC 
504 SUNOCO LP SUSP 
505 SUNSTONE HOTEL INVESTORS, INC. SHO 
506 SUNTECH POWER HOLDINGS CO., LTD. STP 
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507 SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO SWFT 
508 SYMETRA FINANCIAL CORP SYA 
509 SYMMETRY MEDICAL INC. SMA 
510 SYNCORA HOLDINGS LTD SCA 
511 SYNIVERSE HOLDINGS INC SVR 
512 TABLEAU SOFTWARE INC DATA 
513 TAL EDUCATION GROUP XRS 
514 TAL INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. TAL 
515 TALLGRASS ENERGY PARTNERS, LP TEP 
516 TAM S.A. TAM 
517 TAMINCO CORP TAM 
518 TARGA RESOURCES CORP. TRGP 
519 TAYLOR MORRISON HOME CORP TMHC 
520 TEAM HEALTH HOLDINGS INC. TMH 
521 TEAVANA HOLDINGS INC TEA 
522 TEEKAY LNG PARTNERS L.P. TGP 
523 TEEKAY OFFSHORE PARTNERS L.P. TOO 
524 TEEKAY TANKERS LTD. TNK 
525 TELKOM SA LTD TKG 
526 TEMPUR SEALY INTERNATIONAL, INC. TPX 
527 TERNIUM S.A. TX 
528 TERRENO REALTY CORP TRNO 
529 TESORO LOGISTICS LP TLLP 
530 TEXTAINER GROUP HOLDINGS LTD TGH 
531 THE FIRST MARBLEHEAD CORP FMD 
532 THE HOWARD HUGHES CORP HHC 
533 THE PHOENIX COMPANIES INC/DE PNX 
534 THERMON GROUP HOLDINGS, INC. THR 
535 THIRD POINT REINSURANCE LTD. TPRE 
536 TILLY'S, INC. TLYS 
537 TIM HORTONS INC. THI 
538 TMS INTERNATIONAL CORP. TMS 
539 TODCO THE 
540 TRADE STREET RESIDENTIAL, INC. FMP 
541 TRANSDIGM GROUP INC TDG 
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542 TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY CORP TAP'A 
543 TRI POINTE GROUP, INC. TPH 
544 TRIPLE-S MANAGEMENT CORP GTS 
545 TRONOX INC TRX 
546 TRULIA, INC. TRLA 
547 TUMI HOLDINGS, INC. TUMI 
548 TWITTER, INC. TWTR 
549 TYCOM LTD TCM 
550 U.S. SHIPPING PARTNERS L.P. USS 
551 U.S. SILICA HOLDINGS, INC. SLCA 
552 UCP, INC. UCP 
553 UNITED DEFENSE INDUSTRIES INC UDI 
554 UNIVERSAL COMPRESSION HOLDINGS INC UCO 
555 UNIVERSAL TECHNICAL INSTITUTE INC UTI 
556 USA COMPRESSION PARTNERS, LP USAC 
557 VALERO ENERGY PARTNERS LP VLP 
558 VALIDUS HOLDINGS LTD VR 
559 VANGUARD HEALTH SYSTEMS INC VHS 
560 VANTIV, INC. VNTV 
561 VEDANTA LTD SLT 
562 VEEVA SYSTEMS INC VEEV 
563 VENOCO, INC. VQ 
564 VERASUN ENERGY CORP VSE 
565 VERIDIAN CORP VNX 
566 VERIFONE SYSTEMS, INC. PAY 
567 VERSO CORP VRS 
568 VIASYSTEMS GROUP INC VG 
569 VINCE HOLDING CORP. VNCE 
570 VIOLIN MEMORY INC VMEM 
571 VIRGIN MOBILE USA, INC. VM 
572 VISA INC. V 
573 VISTEON CORP VC 
574 VITAMIN SHOPPE, INC. VSI 
575 VMWARE, INC. VMW 
576 VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP VG 
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577 VOYA FINANCIAL, INC. VOYA 
578 W&T OFFSHORE INC WTI 
579 WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORP. WMG 
580 WCI COMMUNITIES INC WCI 
581 WCI COMMUNITIES, INC. WCIC 
582 WEIGHT WATCHERS INTERNATIONAL INC WTW 
583 WELLCARE HEALTH PLANS, INC. WCG 
584 WELLCHOICE INC WC 
585 WESCO AIRCRAFT HOLDINGS, INC WAIR 
586 WESTERN ASSET MORTGAGE CAPITAL CORP WMC 
587 WESTERN GAS EQUITY PARTNERS, LP WGP 
588 WESTERN GAS PARTNERS LP WES 
589 WESTERN UNION CO WU 
590 WESTLAKE CHEMICAL CORP WLK 
591 WESTMORELAND RESOURCE PARTNERS, LP OXF 
592 WESTPORT RESOURCES CORP WRC 
593 WEX INC. WXS 
594 WHITEWAVE FOODS CO WWAV 
595 WHITING PETROLEUM CORP WHZ 
596 WHITING PETROLEUM CORP WLL 
597 WILLIAM LYON HOMES WLH 
598 WILLIAMS PARTNERS L.P. CHKM 
599 WILLIAMS PARTNERS L.P. WPZ 
600 WILLIAMS PIPELINE PARTNERS L.P. WMZ 
601 WILLIS TOWERS WATSON PLC WSH 
602 WIPRO LTD WIT 
603 WNS (HOLDINGS) LTD WNS 
604 WORKDAY, INC. WDAY 
605 WSP HOLDINGS LTD WH 
606 WUXI PHARMATECH (CAYMAN) INC. WX 
607 XERIUM TECHNOLOGIES INC XRM 
608 XINYUAN REAL ESTATE CO., LTD. XIN 
609 YELP INC YELP 
610 YINGLI GREEN ENERGY HOLDING CO LTD YGE 
611 YOUKU TUDOU INC. YOKU 
 40 
 
612 ZAIS FINANCIAL CORP. ZFC 
613 ZF TRW AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS CORP TRW 
614 ZOETIS INC. ZTS 
 
 
